

Moving Economies Forward.



# The Significant Impacts of Work Stoppages in Canada's Transportation Sector



2025

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## Introduction

Recurring labour disruptions are a major threat to Canada's supply chains and its reputation as a reliable trading partner. Disruptions in transportation industries, such as rail, ports, aviation, and trucking, have far-reaching effects that extend beyond the directly involved employers and bargaining employees. Labour disputes in these critical sectors can stall the broader Canadian economy, impacting key industries including agriculture, automotive manufacturing, construction, natural resources, and more.

As an export-driven nation, Canada is particularly vulnerable to disruptions in its transportation supply chain, and rail sector disruptions cause some of the largest impacts. Canadian railways transport approximately \$380 billion worth of goods each year, or roughly \$1 billion per day.<sup>i</sup> In August 2024, Moody's Corporation estimated that a work stoppage at both CN and CPKC could have a \$341 million per day impact on the economy.<sup>ii</sup>

In this paper, we make an important contribution to the existing literature by comparing the relative economic impacts of work stoppages in different transportation industries. The results show that, on average, GDP losses from work stoppages in rail are roughly ten times larger than work stoppages in trucking and about 20 times more significant than in aviation. Nearly two-thirds of the unrecoverable GDP losses from rail work stoppages fall on other, non-rail sectors.

In 2024, the transportation and warehousing sector experienced the greatest number of person-days<sup>iii</sup> not worked (from work stoppages) since 1966. In the wake of multiple damaging work stoppages across critical Canadian supply chains, affecting workers in several industries, Canada must consider alternatives to the current *Canada Labour Code* process to protect supply chain reliability while respecting collective bargaining.

The *United States Railway Labor Act* (USRLA) offers a model which begins the mediation process before a work stoppage may happen using the National Mediation Board as a third-party arbitrator. The flow of business can continue under the original contract until an agreement is reached, which avoids harming the wider supply chain (see [A Path Towards Labour Certainty](#)). The *Canada Labour Code* should be amended to grant the federal cabinet authority to compel binding arbitration instead of requiring a Ministerial reference to the Canada Industrial Relations Board (CIRB) once a stoppage begins. With such an amendment to the *Code*, the collective bargaining process would still be respected and preferred, as the best agreement is one that is negotiated between all parties.

A resilient transportation network is essential for Canada's economic growth and global competitiveness, particularly amid the evolving trade war with the U.S. Work stoppages erode investment confidence, risk long-term supply chain shifts to U.S. routes, and, of course, undermine Canada's standing as a stable trading partner. This paper highlights the impacts of labour uncertainty on Canada's GDP, workers' earnings, and trade, and the outsized impacts of stoppages in the rail industry.

1 Presented at the 60<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting of the *Canadian Transportation Research Forum*, 2025


## CANADA'S HISTORY OF LABOUR DISRUPTIONS

### Data on Canada's Labour Disruptions

According to a 2019 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) study, since the 1990s, among OECD member countries, Canada has consistently ranked as one of the countries with the highest number of lost days to work stoppages relative to employment levels –

more than five times the OECD median.<sup>iv</sup> Canada has never ranked better than 27 out of 33 countries. In addition, Canada performs much worse than its North American partners, who both experienced fewer work days lost than the OECD median in the 2008-2018 period.

**Fig. 1 Work Days Lost from Industrial Disputes, 2008-2018**



Source: RAC Analysis based on OECD, *Negotiating Our Way Up: Collective Bargaining in a Changing World of Work*, November 18, 2019.


Since the OECD study was published, work stoppage trends in Canada have not improved. In fact, there has been a significant increase in work stoppages over the last two years, both within the transportation and warehousing sector and across the country.

[Figure 2](#) shows that, in 2023, the number of person-days not worked (PDNW) from work stoppages in Canada was 6,600,308, the highest experienced since 1986, and the number of PDNW in 2024 (2,376,962) was the highest since 2005 (aside from 2023).

In 2023, the number of PDNW from work stoppages in the transportation and warehousing sector was 230,160, the highest since 2011, and the number of PDNW in 2024 (1,318,160) was the highest since 1966.

The dramatic increase in work stoppages negatively impacts the Canadian economy, workers earnings, and undermines Canada's reputation as a reliable trading partner.

Fig. 2 Person-Days Not Worked



Source: Statistics Canada. Table 14-10-0352-01 Work stoppages in Canada, by jurisdiction and industry based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), Employment and Social Development Canada - Labour Program. <https://doi.org/10.25318/1410035201-eng>

History of Government Intervention

Work stoppages in the rail industry are largely a federal matter, though some fall under provincial jurisdiction. From 1946 to 2024, 178 of 252 (70.6%) work stoppages were under federal jurisdiction.<sup>v</sup> When considering both the number of workers involved and the duration, which is a better measure of the magnitude of work stoppages, 92.4% of PDNW in the rail sector were under federal jurisdiction.

The federal government has a history of intervening in work stoppages to address the harms that disruptions cause to Canada's economy. Back-to-work legislation was first used by the federal government in 1950, when unionized railway workers launched a nationwide strike. The movement of essential goods was stalled, which was a major cause for concern amongst Canadians. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent's government stepped in after eight days of work stoppage, ending the strike and enforcing dispute resolution.

Since 1950, the federal government has intervened 44 times in Canadian labour disputes, 38 of which were in the transportation and warehousing sector. Through these interventions, back-to-work legislation was passed 37 times and binding arbitration imposed through ministerial order on seven occasions.<sup>vi</sup>

The federal government is responsible for the overall stewardship of the Canadian economy. A work stoppage in transportation significantly limits the flow of goods and affects the national economy. By ending a labour dispute, the government provides a reasonable path that enables workers earnings and, importantly, the health of the national economy to be restored.

Government interventions in work stoppages through back-to-work legislation have been criticized by unions as undermining collective bargaining rights. However, Canadian history demonstrates that intervention is used to restore the flow of goods and protect the national economy, not to undermine unions in advancing the interests of their members.



These interventions are made in recognition that work stoppages in the transportation supply chain impose significant social costs on millions of Canadians across the country that are external to the dispute. As shown in this paper, most of

the negative economic impacts from rail work stoppages are felt in other, non-rail sectors. The CIRB appoints impartial mediators who are skilled in labour relations and mediation to reach fair solutions.

## LABOUR DISRUPTIONS IN CANADA'S TRANSPORTATION SECTOR – DETAILED HISTORY

Data provided by Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) to the Railway Association of Canada (RAC) show that, from 1946-2024, there have been 4,685 work stoppages in the transportation and warehousing sector, resulting in 19,291,978 PDNW.

Nearly one quarter (21.7%) of PDNW in transportation and warehousing were in the rail industry, second only to the postal service industry. Measured using PDNW, work stoppages


in rail are relatively large compared to stoppages in other transportation industries. From 1946-2024, the average rail industry work stoppage resulted in 16,653 PDNW, more than four times the transportation and warehousing average of 4,122 PDNW.

### Recent Major Disruptions

In 2023 and 2024, Canada's transportation sector faced several major, disruptive work stoppages in key transportation supply chains.

### July 2023 B.C. Ports Strike

**Fig. 3 Port of Vancouver, Total TEUs**



Source: Port of Vancouver, *Container Statistics Report*.

In July 2023, North American supply chains were negatively impacted by 13 days of strike activity at B.C. ports. Approximately 7,000 workers were on strike, resulting in nearly 100,000 PDNW. This figure does not include the workers impacted in related industries, such as forestry, fertilizers, and manufacturing, who were unable to move their

product through Canada's busiest port, Vancouver, for two weeks. Knock-on supply chain effects included temporary layoffs, curtails in production, backlogs for other transportation supply chain service providers, and traffic diversions away from Canadian ports, which continued even after the strike was over.

In July 2023, container traffic flowing through Canada's busiest port was reduced by approximately one third, or ~100,000 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units).<sup>vii</sup> Much of that volume was unrecoverable. As [figure 3](#) demonstrates, when comparing 2023 data against 2022, rather than rebounding following the strike, 2023 container traffic remained down 23% year-over-year in August, 12% in September, and 10% in October. This represents a year-over-year reduction of 257,086 TEUs in July to October 2023.

Canada's ports have ranked amongst the worst performers globally for years.<sup>viii</sup> This work stoppage was not helpful in improving the country's reputation as a reliable trading partner, which is especially concerning since these ports are in direct competition with U.S. ports. High volumes of cargo flow from Asia through North America's west coast ports. When B.C. ports gain that traffic, and goods flow through Canada by truck or rail to major population centres like Chicago, Toronto, or Montreal, a significant amount of economic activity is generated for Canadians across many sectors. Conversely, when a strike reduces the capacity of Canadian ports, the traffic is often rerouted to a U.S. point of entry, depriving the Canadian economy of the benefits associated with the traffic.

## 2024 Rail Work Stoppage

In May 2024, there was uncertainty about a potential work stoppage at CN and CPKC, as Teamsters Canada Rail Conference (TCRC) employees<sup>ix</sup> voted to strike as early as May 22, 2024. On May 9, 2024, the Minister of Labour intervened by referring a question to the CIRB regarding which activities should be maintained during a strike or lockout in order to prevent an immediate and serious danger to the health or safety of the public, thereby suspending a potential strike until the CIRB issued its decision. While there was no strike in May, traffic diversions occurred and week-over-week network-wide traffic for CN and CPKC (combined) decreased by 10% the week of May 19-25.

The referral created more uncertainty about the availability of Canadian rail service until the decision of the CIRB was issued. Between May and August, many shipping lines simply redirected traffic to U.S. ports in an effort to reduce the risks associated with any potential work stoppage.

On August 9, 2024, the CIRB confirmed that no activities must be maintained in the event of a work stoppage involving the TCRC at both CN and CPKC. The CIRB ordered a 13-day extension of the cooling-off period, thereby placing the parties back in the positions they were in on May 9, 2024. This meant that a strike or lockout could occur as early as August 22, 2024.

That same day, CPKC issued notice to the TCRC of its plan to lock out Train and Engine (T&E) and Rail Traffic Controller (RCTC) division employees on August 22, 2024. On August 18, 2024, the TCRC issued its 72-hour strike notice, and a work stoppage at CPKC began on August 22, 2024. The Minister of Labour then exercised his authority under s.107 of the *Canada Labour Code* directing the CIRB to impose final binding arbitration and for railway operations to resume the very same day. On August 24, the CIRB ordered CPKC and TCRC employees to return to work. Operations resumed on August 26, 2024, following a four-day shutdown lasting from August 22 through August 25, 2024.

On August 18, 2024, CN similarly issued a 72-hour lockout notice to the TCRC. A work stoppage began at 00:01 ET on August 22, 2024, however CN ended the lockout at 18:00 ET the very same day in response to the Minister's order to resume operations. On August 23, 2024, the TCRC issued a 72-hour strike notice, effective August 26, 2024, at 10:00 ET, however, that strike never materialized. On August 24, 2024, the CIRB executed the Minister's direction by imposing binding arbitration and suspending the ability of the parties to strike or lockout during the arbitration process. The 18-hour lockout that occurred from 00:01 to 18:00 ET on August 22, 2024 was never recorded as an official work stoppage in ESDC's data – despite producing negative impacts on the company, workers, and the Canadian economy.


Rail operations were impacted well before the work stoppages began. In anticipation of the August 2024 work stoppages, both railways issued embargoes and stopped accepting traffic, especially dangerous and hazardous materials, to ensure public safety and compliance with applicable regulations. Traffic diversions continued as shippers held back shipments or relied on other transportation options. Week-over-week network-wide traffic<sup>xi</sup> for CN and CPKC (combined) decreased by 33% the week of August 18-24. As per the ESDC data, fewer than 3,500 rail industry workers were on strike, but the disruption was significant enough that it impacted

the productivity of the entire ~40,000-person rail industry workforce.

The graph below shows the impacts of work stoppages (or threats thereof) on weekly rail traffic at both ports and railways, as well as the uncertainty created by the Minister's initial referral regarding the maintenance of activities required during a strike or lockout to the CIRB in May.


Week-over-week, CN & CPKC network-wide traffic (revenue ton-miles) decreased 11% in July 2023, 10% in May 2024, 33% in August 2024, and 10% in November 2024.

**Fig. 4 CN and CPKC Network-wide Revenue Ton-miles**





**Fig. 5 Opinion Polling on Government's Role in a Freight Rail Service Stoppage**



The government has options. Looking at other jurisdictions, the USRLA offers a potential model, which ensures the continuity of railway operations while encouraging dispute resolution. In cases where parties are unable to come to an agreement, the process under the USRLA involves several steps before an interruption to railway operations may occur. The negotiations are managed by the National Mediation Board (NMB). If a dispute between a carrier and its employees is not resolved through mediation or other procedures, and in the judgement of the NMB, “threaten to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service,” the NMB shall notify the U.S. President.<sup>xii</sup> Upon their discretion, the President may create a Presidential Emergency Board (PEB) to investigate the dispute – generally delaying a work stoppage for 60 days.<sup>xiii</sup> The PEB will thereafter have thirty days to make a report to the President, including recommendations for settlement of the dispute. A post-report cooling off period of thirty days then commences, in which parties must continue to work under the original agreement. If no agreement is reached during the cooling off period, parties are then permitted to engage in strikes or lockouts.

The benefits of the USRLA are that negotiation is the primary course of action; there is greater certainty about how the government may act and when; and parties must maintain the status quo during the mediation process. This system reduces the likelihood of a work stoppage compared to Canada’s process and therefore mitigates damages to the wider supply chain.

The Canadian government should amend the *Canada Labour Code* to grant the federal cabinet authority to compel binding arbitration instead of requiring a Ministerial reference to the CIRB. This would offer an efficient method of negotiation while also preventing or ending a work stoppage when necessary to protect the Canadian national economic interest. The collective bargaining process should still be respected and preferred, as the best agreement is one that is negotiated between all parties.

The *Canada Labour Code* already recognizes the loading and movement of grain vessels as an exempted function that must continue at Canada’s ports during what would otherwise be a legally permissible strike or lockout.<sup>xiv</sup> Providing the government with the legal authority to prevent a work stoppage at a railway that transports grain to a port is consistent with the *Canada Labour Code*.

## MODELLING TRANSPORTATION WORK STOPPAGES

There is limited empirical research that evaluates the macroeconomic impacts of labour disruptions. Utilizing a full general equilibrium model, this paper makes an important contribution to the existing literature by quantifying the macroeconomic impacts of work stoppages in Canada, including impacts on national GDP, sectoral GDP, labour income, and internal and international trade.

### Methodology

The economic modelling referenced in this paper was performed by Trevor Tombe, Professor at the University of Calgary's Department of Economics and the Director of Fiscal and Economic Policy at The School of Public Policy.

The model builds on previous work by Alvarez, Krznar, and Tombe (2019)<sup>xv</sup> and Tombe and Winter (2021)<sup>xvi</sup> but includes a more detailed breakdown of Canada's economy, representing 230 interconnected industries across 13 provinces and territories. International trade is also included in the model. It is structured using Statistics Canada's supply-and-use tables, input-output tables, and trade data, allowing it to capture the complex interdependencies between sectors and regions. The model tracks how trade flows respond to shifts in productivity, production costs, and trade costs. In effect, a region's productivity depends on the mix of locally produced and imported goods, with greater specialization in high-productivity activities driving overall gains from trade. This structure allows the model to capture not just the direct effect of productivity changes (from, for example, work stoppages) but also their cascading effects throughout other sectors of the economy due to input-output linkages. In this paper, work stoppages are modelled as productivity shocks to the sectors in which they occur.

Data on work stoppages come from ESDC's Labour Program. Public data are available for 11 sectors<sup>xvii</sup> (e.g., transportation and warehousing, NAICS 48-49). ESDC provided RAC with detailed data at the three-digit NAICS level for the transportation and warehousing sector (e.g., rail, air, truck, water, postal service, support activities, etc.) to allow for the analysis of individual transportation industries.

To evaluate the impacts of work stoppages, the size of the average work stoppages (in years with one or more stoppages) is determined for each industry in relation to that industry's base employment level.<sup>xviii</sup> This enables the average work stoppages to be expressed as a share of total work days for that year. Data from the last ten years (2015-2024) are used.

Using rail as an example, there have been work stoppages in five of the past ten years. In each of those years, the number of PDNW is divided by an estimated level of total days worked in the industry (estimated as total employment<sup>xix</sup> multiplied by 225 days worked) to obtain the share of work days lost. For rail, over the five years this figure averaged 0.19%. Therefore, the productivity shock to rail in the model is set to 0.19%, which works out to 18,306 PDNW in 2024. The impacts of work stoppages are also evaluated on a *per PDNW* basis, which shows the impact of just one individual on strike for one day.

## Comparing Four Transportation Industries

The table below presents the modelling results for work stoppages in rail, air, truck, and support activities for transportation industries. The support activities industry<sup>xx</sup> includes ports, which are a key component in integrated transportation supply chains.

The first three rows of [figure 6](#) show the average work stoppage size. The largest work stoppages

are in the support activities industry, averaging 0.11% of total person-days, or 32,283 PDNW in 2024. However, as a percentage of industry employment, work stoppages are larger in the rail industry, where the work stoppages result in 0.19% of person-days lost. Average work stoppages in air and truck affect a much smaller number of workers, just 0.02% and 0.004% of the industries' total person-days, respectively.

**Fig. 6 Impacts of Work Stoppages in Select Transportation Industries**

		Rail	Air	Truck	Support Activities
Modelling a "typical" work stoppage year	Estimated person-days* worked	9.6 million	16.5 million	47.7 million	30.2 million
	% of total person-days lost	0.19%	0.02%	0.004%	0.11%
	Average number of PDNW**	18,306	2,766	1,811	32,283
GDP Impact	From stoppage (\$M)	-\$57.1	-\$2.9	-\$5.5	-\$87.2
	Per PDNW (\$)	-\$3,121	-\$1,046	-\$3,059	-\$2,700
Labour Income Impact	From stoppage (\$M)	-\$37.9	-\$4.1	-\$4.2	-\$65.0
	Per PDNW (\$)	-\$2,070	-\$1,482	-\$2,319	-\$2,041
Two-way International Trade Impact	From stoppage (\$M)	-\$163.2	-\$8.8	-\$16.1	-\$247.6
	Per PDNW (\$)	-\$8,915	-\$3,181	-\$8,890	-\$7,670

\* Person-days (per year) are estimated by multiplying industry employment by 225 working days.

\*\* In years with one or more work stoppage.

When there is a work stoppage in the transportation sector, some traffic may shift to other companies or other transportation modes, and some traffic may be front loaded before the work stoppage and/or increased following the stoppage to make up for lost volumes. However, despite the shifting of traffic, there is a permanent, unrecoverable loss.

The average work stoppage in rail (18,306 PDNW) reduces GDP by \$57.1 million dollars, labour income by \$37.9 million, and two-way international trade by \$163.2 million. These impacts are about ten times larger than the impacts from the average work stoppage in trucking. Impacts from stoppages in the air transportation industry are

even smaller across all three indicators. Work stoppages in the support activities industry, which average the highest number of PDNW, result in the largest impacts.

To compare the impacts of work stoppages across transportation industries in a more meaningful way, the GDP, labour income, and trade impacts are presented on a per PDNW basis. That is, what is the impact of one person being on strike for just one day.

On a per PDNW basis, work stoppages in rail have the most significant negative impact on GDP and trade. Just one person on strike for one

day reduces Canadian GDP by \$3,121 (non-rail industries bear the majority of this loss), workers' incomes are reduced by \$2,070, and two-way international trade decreases by nearly \$9,000. Impacts across the three indicators are similar

for trucking. The impacts of stoppages in the air transportation industry are much smaller, with the GDP and trade impacts about one third the size experienced in rail and truck, and the labour income impact is about 30% lower. Impacts on a per PDNW basis in the support activities industry are slightly smaller than in rail and truck across all three indicators.


### Sectoral Impacts of Rail Work Stoppages

Nearly two-thirds of the GDP impacts from rail work stoppages are experienced outside of the rail industry. The rail industry bears 36.0% of the GDP impact while the remaining 64.0% is spread across the other 200+ industries in the model.

Figure 7 covers the sectors most impacted by the rail work stoppage. Following rail, residential building construction is the most heavily impacted industry, absorbing 8.1% of the total GDP impact. Across the country, housing affordability is a top concern for Canadians and a key priority for all political parties. A rail work stoppage risks slowing housing construction and increasing the cost to build homes. The next hardest hit industry provides critical inputs to the residential building construction industry – sawmills and wood preservation (2.5% of the total GDP impact). This industry produces boards, dimensional lumber, timber, poles and ties.

The list of those most impacted includes several primary and manufacturing industries, including automotive, agri-food products, metals, wood, pulp and paper, among others.

**Fig. 7 Sectoral Distribution of the GDP Impacts of Rail Work Stoppages**



## Conservative Estimates

The modelling results should be taken as conservative estimates of the impacts of work stoppages. There are several impacts that cannot be captured, especially for rail. These desktop numbers are provided to enable a comparison across transportation industries, but do not represent the full value of total economic losses, which certainly exceed the modelling estimates for reasons outlined below.

- **Duration uncertainty:** Since the duration of a work stoppage is unknown until after it concludes, there can be hesitancy to ship by rail, and traffic may be redirected to other routes or other modes. Even if the stoppage is short lived or entirely avoided, traffic levels and productivity are negatively impacted.
- **Wind down:** A railway has its assets (as well as cargo from thousands of shippers) spread over a vast network. Railways must wind down operations and secure all equipment prior to a work stoppage. It is especially important, for both legal and safety reasons, to secure hazardous goods and other materials that cannot be left on the network during a stoppage. The wind down of operations involves unproductive moves, reducing traffic levels and industry productivity before the stoppage begins.
- **Specialized roles and bargaining unit structure:** There are several interdependent functions across a railway. The model employed in this paper assumes that workers that are not on strike are still working and productive, but in most rail cases they are not. For example, ~10,000 conductors and locomotive engineers (~one quarter of industry employment) could bring all rail traffic to a standstill.
- **Reputational damage:** Work stoppages can lead to reputational damage, which can affect overall demand for the service moving forward.

In addition, the modelling in this paper is of the *average* work stoppage, which is not the same as a full-scale service stoppage at all major Canadian railways. Work stoppages may involve particular bargaining employees at specific companies, including at regional and shortline railways. The impact of a full-scale rail industry work stoppage is beyond the scope of this paper.

## CONCLUSION

This paper highlights and quantifies the significant impact of labour disruptions in Canada's transportation sector on supply chains and the broader economy. Work stoppages, particularly in rail and ports, disrupt critical industries and jeopardize Canada's reputation as a reliable trading partner. To prevent such disruptions from crippling the economy, the Canadian government should amend the existing *Canada Labour Code* to grant the federal cabinet authority to compel binding arbitration which would ensure that labour disputes in transportation do not affect the broader economy. Public support for government intervention emphasizes the urgency of taking action to avoid future economic breakdowns. By implementing legislative safeguards to prevent transportation sector disruptions, Canada can strengthen its transportation network, build more resilient supply chains, and provide reliable support to other vital sectors of the economy.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank Trevor Tombe, Professor at the University of Calgary's Department of Economics and the Director of Fiscal and Economic Policy at The School of Public Policy, for conducting the economic modelling referenced in this paper.



<sup>i</sup> Source: Railway Association of Canada, *Rail Trends Database*.

<sup>ii</sup> Jordan Gowling, *Clock is ticking: Railway shutdown expected to cost Canada \$341 million a day*, Financial Post, August 22, 2024. <https://financialpost.com/news/canada-railway-shutdown-cost-341-million-each-day-moodys>

<sup>iii</sup> Regarding work stoppages, "person-days" are calculated by multiplying the number of directly impacted workers by the duration of the work stoppage. For example, one worker on strike for 100 days, or 10 workers on strike for 10 days, both result in 100 person-days not worked.

<sup>iv</sup> OECD, *Negotiating Our Way Up: Collective Bargaining in a Changing World of Work*, November 18, 2019

<sup>v</sup> Source: RAC analysis based on Employment and Social Development Canada data provided to RAC.

<sup>vi</sup> (forthcoming) Prof. Ian Lee, *Labour Disruptions in Canadian Transportation Sector, 1950-2024*.

<sup>vii</sup> In July 2023, traffic was down 87,651 TEUs (31%) compared to June 2023, 108,089 TEUs (35%) compared to July 2022, and 110,239 TEUs (36%) compared to July 2024.

<sup>viii</sup> World Bank and S&P Global Market Intelligence, *Container Port Performance Index*, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023 reports. See rankings for Canada's major ports, including the Port of Vancouver and Port of Montreal.

<sup>ix</sup> For CPKC, this includes Train and Engine (T&E) and Rail Traffic Controller (RTCC) divisions; for CN, this includes conductors, conductor trainees, yard coordinators and locomotive engineers.

<sup>x</sup> Traffic measured using revenue ton-miles. Network-wide includes CN's Canadian and U.S. operations, and CPKC's Canadian, U.S., and Mexican operations. Source: CN *Key Weekly Metrics*; CPKC *Weekly Key Metrics*.

<sup>xi</sup> Measured using revenue ton-miles. Source: CN *Key Weekly Metrics*; CPKC *Weekly Key Metrics*.

<sup>xii</sup> [https://nmb.gov/NMB\\_Application/index.php/nmb-rules/](https://nmb.gov/NMB_Application/index.php/nmb-rules/)

<sup>xiii</sup> [https://nmb.gov/NMB\\_Application/index.php/presidential-emergency-boards/](https://nmb.gov/NMB_Application/index.php/presidential-emergency-boards/)

<sup>xiv</sup> Government of Canada, *Labour Code*, February 4, 2025.

<sup>xv</sup> Alvarez, Jorge, Ivo Krznar, and Trevor Tombe. 2019. *Internal Trade in Canada: Case for Liberalization*. IMF Working Paper 158. International Monetary Fund. Available at <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/07/22/Internal-Trade-in-Canada-Case-for-Liberalization-47100>.

<sup>xvi</sup> Tombe, Trevor and Jennifer Winter. 2021. "Fiscal integration with internal trade: Quantifying the effects of federal transfers in Canada." *Canadian Journal of Economics* 54(2): 522–556.

<sup>xvii</sup> Data is available for 11 sectors at the two-digit NAICS level (e.g., manufacturing) or a combination of two-digit NAICS codes (e.g., NAICS 61 and 62 for education, health and social services).

<sup>xviii</sup> In years with more than one work stoppage, the work stoppages are combined and treated as one annual work stoppage.

<sup>xix</sup> Employment is from Statistics Canada's *Survey of Employment, Payrolls and Hours (SEPH)*. 2024 is based on Jan-Nov data.

<sup>xx</sup> Support activities for transportation includes various industries, including airport operations, port and harbor operations, navigational services to shipping, freight transportation arrangement, packing and crating, to name a few.